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DIRECT FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN
MANAGED CARE: UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
Henry T. Greely*
THE DIAGNOSIS WAS DEVASTATING. Joyce - a health-
conscious mother of a three-year-old son - had colon cancer.
Twenty months and seven operations later, she was dead at age
thirty-four.
Her husband contends that it was greed that killed Joyce
Ching.
In a malpractice suit scheduled for trial this summer, he al-
leges that the financial incentives in their contracts with the
HMO prompted his wife's doctors to place their interests ahead
of hers)
About the only phenomenon in American health care grow-
ing faster than managed care is concern about managed care.2
The Ching case is only one of the most dramatic signs of this
concern. Fear of managed care has been voiced loudly by two
groups that rarely agree: organized medicine and the consumers
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I want to thank Professor Mehlman for the
opportunity to participate in the workshop from which this article is drawn and all the partici-
pants for their thoughtful and stimulating presentations. This Article benefited particularly
from the comments of Professor Frances Miller and the excellent work of my research assis-
tant, Madeline Cohen. I also want to note that my wife is a physician with the Permanente
Medical Group, and my family and I are members of the Kaiser Permanente system, one of
the managed care organizations discussed in this Article.
1. David R. Olmos, Cutting Medical Costs or Cutting Corners?, L.A. TIMES, May 5,
1995, at Al. See infra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text for more detail.
2. For a selection of concerned articles from the first part of 1995, see, e.g., Carolyn
M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA 338 (1995) (ad-
dressing ethical issues of the physician-patient relationship in managed care); Council on Eth-
ical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA
330 (1995) (discussing the integrity of the physician-patient relationship in managed care);
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship
in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995) (exploring the threat presented by man-
aged care to the physician-patient relationship); Mark A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care,
332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 604 (1995) (addressing potential conflicts created by managed care);
Adam Yarmolinsky, Supporting the Patient, 332 NEw ENG. J. MaD. 602 (1995) (arguing that
the physician-patient relationship may be harmed by business-owned HMOs).
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movement. Managed care, they assert, threatens the health of pa-
tients, and the ethics and finances of doctors.
At the same time, managed care has almost entirely taken
over health care financing in some parts of the country. In Cali-
fornia, about thirty-eight percent of the population, and about
sixty percent of those with private insurance, belong to health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), the epitome of managed
care, while another thirty-six percent of the population belongs to
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), another form of man-
aged care.3 Even the Medicare population, which traditionally
has resisted managed care, increasingly belongs to HMOs in Cal-
ifornia. More than thirty percent of Medicare recipients in Cali-
fornia belong to "risk contract" HMOs, 4 compared to a national
average of about seven percent.5 An increasing percentage of
Medicaid recipients also belong to "risk contract" HMOs. This
strong movement to managed care has not sent health care in
California tumbling into the Pacific-not yet, at least. Is man-
aged care a threat to patients?
This Article begins to investigate that question with respect
to one sort of managed care: managed care that uses direct finan-
cial incentives to affect physician behavior. It starts by setting
out what we do know and, more importantly, what we do not
know about the use of direct financial incentives in managed
care. It then describes the very important, but often overlooked,
fact that direct financial incentives provided by managed care
usually are not direct, but are transformed into indirect incentives
by compensation policies of physician groups. Finally, it consid-
ers what actions, both in the short run and in the long run, soci-
ety should take to deal with the use of such incentives. I con-
3. Steven Findlay, California: Edgy at the Cutting Edge, Bus. & HEALTH, July 1995, at
36, 43. As long ago as 1991, in the San Francisco Bay Area, my home, about half of the en-
tire population, and about 80% of those privately insured belonged to health maintenance or-
ganizations. Jane Birnbaum, Health Care Plans of a New Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1993, at A39.
4. Geraldine Dallek, Executive Director, Center for Health Rights, Testimony before
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Federal Oversight of Medicare HMOs: Assuring Benefi-
ciary Protection (Aug. 3, 1995). Both this statistic, and the following one, refer to HMOs that
have accepted "risk contracts" with Medicare. They are paid on a capitated basis. Some
HMOs accepted Medicare members as patients but have chosen to be reimbursed for them in
Medicare's traditional manner.
5. The Future of Medicare, July 12, 1995: House Commerce Comm., Subcomm. on
Health and Environment (testimony of Jonathan Ratner, Associate Director, Health Financing
and Policy Issues, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office).
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clude that we need further research into the use and
consequences of direct financial incentives for managed care, but
that such incentive systems, when delivered through fairly large
physician groups may, in fact, be an excellent way for society to
pay for health care.
I. WHAT WE (DO NOT) KNOW ABOUT DIRECT
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Before probing the consequences for patients of direct finan-
cial incentives in managed care, we need to understand more
about these incentives. This section first describes the direct fi-
nancial incentives used in managed care. It then surveys what we
know about the extent to which managed care uses different di-
rect financial incentives. Finally, it looks at the actual incidence
of direct financial incentives on the physicians who provide pa-
tient care.
A. What Are Direct Financial Incentives?
Managed care has become a vague term for almost any sys-
tem in which third parties pay for medical care, other than the
"traditional" system of nearly unquestioning payment on a fee-
for-service basis for anything ordered by a licensed physician. 6
In fact, there are three basic approaches that payors take toward
managing care: micro-management, panel selection, and direct fi-
nancial incentives.
Micro-management encompasses a variety of ways in which
the payor "second guesses" a physician's recommendation and a
patient's decision. The most common form of micro-management
is through various types of utilization review. Prospective review
requires approval by the payor, or its agent, of a physician's rec-
ommendation before the action is undertaken, whether it is an
expensive procedure or a hospitalization. Concurrent review in
hospitals or elsewhere most commonly is applied to inpatient
care. It requires approval for continuing the patient's stay in the
institution. Retrospective review involves deciding, after the fact,
6. It is worth noting that this "traditional" system did not cover a majority of Ameri-
cans until sometime after World War II. See generally PAUL STARR, TiE SociAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMmRCAN MEDiciNE (1982) (tracing the history of the physician-patient relationship
and the growth of the health insurance industry). The last two generations of doctors and pa-
tients are accustomed to it, but it scarcely has great depths of history behind it.
Winter 1996]
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whether or not the provided services were "proper" and hence,
whether they will be reimbursed.
The second approach that payors take towards managing
care is through panel selection. In a panel selection (and "de-se-
lection") system, the payor "manages" care indirectly by en-
couraging or requiring its customers to use only particular physi-
cians or facilities. It then selects the providers that are part of its
plan based, among other things, on their costs to the payor.
These costs encompass both the amount of the fees charged by
the provider, often heavily discounted, and the cost of that pro-
vider's style of practice. The providers are encouraged to be eco-
nomical not by direct micro-management, but by knowing that
they will no longer be on the panel should they fail to meet the
plan's standards for the cost of practice style. This creates an in-
direct financial incentive for physicians as such de-selection, pre-
sumably, would cut the number of the physicians' patients and
reduce their incomes. Panel selection and micro-management are
often combined, but they need not be.
The third method of managing care is through direct finan-
cial incentives. These can take many forms, but the key is struc-
turing the physician's compensation in ways that create incen-
tives to practice economically. Direct financial incentives in
medicine are by no means new. The traditional fee-for-service
system was a system of direct financial incentives; the more a
physician did, the more the physician got paid. The financial in-
centives in a managed care system are aimed at discouraging the
physician from doing everything possible, and instead aim at en-
couraging the physician to provide the "right" amount of care.
Direct financial incentives also can be combined with panel se-
lection and micro-management. If the incentives are strong
enough, however, they should make the other systems
unnecessary.
But what are these incentives? One federal statute defined a
"physician incentive plan" for Medicare and Medicaid purposes
so broadly as to be of questionable value, to wit: "any compen-
sation arrangement between an eligible organization and a physi-
cian or physician group that may directly or indirectly have the
effect of reducing or limiting services provided with respect to
individuals enrolled with the organization." ' 7 As that definition
7. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4204(a)(1)(B),
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implies, financial incentives can take many forms, but four gen-
eral approaches are commonly used: salary, capitation, profit
sharing, and bonus.8 Each can be combined with others in a vari-
ety of forms.
Under a salaried system, the physician's income is set by
the plan, generally annually, through a salary. A salaried physi-
cian has no incentive to do "too much" for patients in order to
make more money. Her incentive to do what the managed care
plan considers "the right amount" comes from the fact that her
salary could be raised or lowered, or she could be fired, depend-
ing on the cost of her practice patterns.
Under a capitated system, the physician is paid a certain
amount, generally on a monthly basis, for each of the managed
care plan's patients for whom she is responsible. In its purest
form, if the doctor spends less than the capitated amount, she
makes a profit on that patient; if she spends more, she takes a
loss. Capitation comes in a dizzying number of forms, with the
variations spreading over at least two dimensions.
One dimension is the range of services included in the capi-
tation. Capitation to a primary care physician almost always will
include primary care services. It may or may not include the
costs of specialty or hospital services. It may include or exclude
laboratory or radiological services. It could, but rarely does, in-
clude mental health services or pharmaceutical costs. If a service
is excluded from the capitation agreement, its costs are not
charged against the capitated physician, but are paid from some
other pool of funds.
104 Stat. 1388-108 (1990) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)).
8. For general discussions of the types of financial incentives used in managed care,
see HEALTH EDUC. & HumAN SERV. Div.. U.S. GEN. Accr. OFFICE. MEDICAID MANAGED CARE
MORE CoMTI-TroN AND OVERSIGrT WOULD IMPROVE CALoRNA's EXPANSION PLAN (1995)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (reporting to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment is-
sues concerning expansion of the Medi-Cal program); Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Re-
quirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg.
59,024, 59,026 (1992) (to be codified at 42 C.FR. pts. 417, 434, & 1003) (proposed Dec. 14,
1992) [hereinafter Physician Incentive Plans] (governing regulation of certain health care or-
ganizations dealing with Medicare and Medicaid) [Since this Article was written, the rule in
question has become a final rule, with modifications. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Re-
quirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg.
13,430 (1996). Its effective date, however, has been largely postponed to 1997. 61 Fed. Reg.
46,384 (Sept. 3, 1996).]; U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERv.. REPORT TO CONGRESS: INCEN-
TIVE ARRANGEMENTs OFFERED BY HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPETITIVE
MEDICAL PLANS TO PHYSICIANS (1990) [hereinafter DHHS REPORT].
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The second dimension is the degree to which the physician
is at risk even for the capitated services. At the extreme, the risk
could be total. A physician receiving ninety dollars per month as
"global" capitation (physician services and hospital services)
might be held financially responsible for the entire $150,000 or
higher costs if he prescribes high dose chemotherapy with autol-
ogous bone marrow transplantation, for example. More com-
monly, however, the risk is shared. The physician might be re-
sponsible for higher costs only up to a certain point, defined
either in terms of dollars per patient or patient pool (through
stop-loss insurance 9) or in terms of a percentage of the capitated
amount (through withheld funds). In the alternative, the physi-
cian, in turn, may spread the risk through capitated arrangements
with other providers, such as hospitals or specialists.
A concrete example might make this more clear. Stanford
University offers its employees a choice among three health
maintenance organizations and the University's own "triple op-
tion" plan.'0 The three options in the triple option plan are:
1) to receive care on an HMO basis from physicians with
whom the University has contracted;
2) to receive care on a "preferred provider" basis from cer-
tain other physicians, while paying a deductible and a twenty
percent copayment; or,
3) to go entirely outside the network to any licensed pro-
vider, but pay a higher deductible and a forty percent
copayment."
The University contracts with three physician groups to pro-
vide the HMO-level care. These physician groups would receive
approximately ninety dollars per month to cover all physician
and hospital services for a middle-aged individual. The physi-
cians then contract with a local hospital to cover all hospital ser-
9. Stop-loss insurance is commonly used to limit the physician's risk. The GAO re-
ported that stop-loss "[c]overage usually begins at between $1,000 and $9,000 per patient per
year for outpatient referral services and between $10,000 and $100,000 per patient per year
for inpatient hospital services." GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 35. As the GAO further
noted, because that limitation is on a per-patient basis, a physician with an unusually expen-
sive patient population might lose money under capitation even with this kind of stop-loss
coverage. As a result, some physicians also like group "stop loss" coverage, where they are
protected once the combined costs of a group of patients exceeds a certain level. Id.
10. Letter from James Franklin, Director of Total Compensation, Stanford University,
to Henry T. Greely, Professor, Stanford Law School (Jan. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Franklin let-
ter] (describing the Stanford triple option plan) (on file with Health Matrix).
11. Id.
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vices for about forty dollars per month. The University's plan ad-
ministrator withholds a percentage of the capitated payment to
each physician group. This "withhold" pool is used to pay for
services members receive under the second and third options, as
well as for unanticipated expenses. At the end of the year, if
money remains in the "withhold" pool, it is shared between the
physician group, which receives eighty percent of the pool, and
the University, which keeps the balance. If no money remains in
that pool, the physician group is left with only the payments it
has already received, but it is not responsible for any cost
overrun.
A third strategy is the bonus. The physicians may be paid
during a fixed period under any system: salary, capitation, or
fee-for-service. At the end of that period, physicians receive a
bonus based on the plan's financial results that year and the phy-
sicians' contribution to them. The manner of determining the bo-
nus can vary widely.
One method sometimes used to determine the bonus makes
up the last approach to direct financial incentives in managed
care, that is, profit sharing. Under this method, the physicians re-
ceive a negotiated share of the plan's profits. They may receive
that share as owners of the plan or otherwise. The details of the
profit-sharing plan may vary widely.
In reality, all of these systems can be used and most of
them can be combined. A salary system usually will have some
kind of bonus, including possibly some profit sharing, to add to
the incentives provided by the salary-setting mechanism. The bo-
nus itself may be determined as a result of some comparison
with expected capitation results. A capitation system also may
have a bonus, determined in a myriad of ways. The number of
possible systems of direct financial incentives is virtually unlim-
ited. Our next problem is to determine how often each method is
actually being used.
B. How Does Managed Care Use Direct Financial Incentives?
About fifty million Americans belong to HMOs. How many
of them belong to HMOs that use each specific type of direct fi-
nancial incentive or that use direct financial incentives at all? We
have almost no idea. We know neither how many plans are using
each different system, nor, more importantly, how many patients
are covered by plans that use each of the different compensation
Wimter 1996]
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forms. This section examines what little evidence exists and
points out several complications in gathering such evidence.
We do know that financial incentives are used widely. In
May 1995, in a report on expanding the use of managed care for
California's Medicaid patients, the General Accounting Office
discussed the different types of compensation schemes used by
HMOs. The report started by noting that "[t]here are no reliable
current data regarding the extent to which HMOs use financial
incentive arrangements or the prevalence of the different types of
arrangements."12
The GAO report cited three pieces of general evidence that
financial incentives were commonly used by HMOs. This evi-
dence included a 1987 survey finding that eighty-five percent
used financial incentives, a 1988 study showing that ninety-five
percent used them, and a 1990 journal article stating that "the
great majority" of HMOs used such incentives.' 3
The use of financial incentives is great, may be growing,
and seems to be broadening. The question remains, how often
are the different incentive systems being used? Little evidence
exists on this point.
The GAO report on managed care provided some evidence
about the use of capitation, and one kind of capitation in particu-
lar in California. It concluded that "it has become increasingly
common for HMOs to capitate physicians, or (more typically)
physician groups, for all medical services - including inpatient
hospital care."' 14 It also reported that "[o]fficials at both HCFA
and California's Department of Corporations told us they be-
lieve . . . that the capitation of medical groups for all medical
services, including inpatient care, is becoming widespread."' 5
In a footnote, the report further explained that:
Under the arrangement, termed "full integration" by a Depart-
ment of Corporations official, the medical groups enter into
contracts with hospitals to provide inpatient care. The hospitals
may be paid on a fee-for-service, capitation, or other basis.
Even if it is capitated, however, the medical group has an in-
centive to hold down referrals to keep down the capitation fee
12. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 33-34.
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it pays the hospital in the next period.16
Information at a national level is even less helpful. The fol-
lowing table shows the answers of managed care plans when
asked how they paid physicians, broken down by the nature of
the HMO. The survey was made in 1993.
PERCENTAGE OF HMO'S BY TYPES
USING DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVE SYSTEMS 17
Salary Profit Fee- Bonus Capita- Totals
Share for- tion
Service
Group 44 20 29 27 63 183
IPA 7 9 74 16 65 171
Net- 17 5 52 20 78 172
work
Staff 92 4 17 21 25 159
As the table indicates, some systems of compensation are
more popular than others, particularly in certain HMO settings.
Staff models, where the physicians are employed by the HMO,
not surprisingly, prefer salary systems; IPA models, where the
physicians practice independently, do not. Profit share models, in
general, are not very popular; capitation systems are (except
among staff model IMOs).
Two points are particularly noteworthy. First, every box in
the table is filled. Every kind of plan uses every kind of finan-
cial compensation. Some IPAs use salaries; some staff models
use fee-for-service. Second, all of the rows total well over 100%,
ranging from approximately 160% to over 180%. Thus, not only
does each type of HMO use every type of compensation, many
of them use more than one kind of compensation system.
The second point is particularly troubling to an effort to
find out how many patients are covered by what kinds of direct
financial incentive systems. Even when a plan uses the same
general approach in compensating physicians, its arrangements
with different groups may include different provisions, leading to
different incentives. This means that we cannot just find out
16. Id. at 34 n.24.
17. Adapted from THE MARION MERRILL Dow MANAGED CARE DIGESr, HMO EDITION,
1994, at 12 (1994) [hereinafter MANAGED CARE DIGESr].
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what methods different HMOs use and then add up the number
of their members. To determine how many patients are covered
by each type of direct financial incentive system, we would have
to ask HMOs what systems they use to pay which physicians,
and then ask how many of their members use each set of differ-
ently compensated physicians.
For an example, return to the Stanford University "triple
option" plan. 8 The university contracts with three local physi-
cian groups and a statewide HMO to provide the HMO level of
care for this plan. Each of the three physician groups is paid on
a capitation basis to cover both the medical and hospital needs of
the triple option members who come to them, but the contractual
negotiations led to somewhat different outcomes.
First, the amount paid to the three groups by Stanford to
cover its members differs from group to group, depending on the
bargains the University struck with each. Presumably, the parties'
bargaining positions and negotiating skills affected the variations
in these overall rates.
Then, each of the physician groups in turn contracted with a
local hospital, designated by the University, to subcapitate the
hospital care of their triple option plan members. The amount the
groups have to pay the hospital varies, in part because some of
the physician groups provided services in their clinics that other
groups obtained through the hospital.
Third, each of the groups' capitation payments are subject
to a percentage withheld to cover member expenses for services
obtained outside the HMO. These are mainly expenses of physi-
cian group patients who go outside the group under the second
or third option of the plan. This "withhold pool" both limits the
risk to the physician group and measures the amount of possible
gain. The percentage withheld varies from group to group, de-
pending on the outcome of their negotiations with the University.
Finally, the HMO level in the triple option plan includes not
only the three local physician groups, but a statewide HMO run
by Blue Shield. This plan pays its participating physicians on a
capitated basis for their patients' medical expenses. The hospital
expenses are not part of the physicians' capitation and, in fact,
are not capitated at all. They are paid on a per diem basis.
18. For this discussion, see the Franklin letter, supra note 10.
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The result is that each of the four sets of doctors participat-
ing in the HMO tier of Stanford's plan, although paid on a capi-
tated basis, is paid differently. Because they are paid differently,
the financial incentives they face in making decisions about a pa-
tient's care differ. They receive different amounts per patient.
They will have different amounts at risk in the use their triple
option members make of the second and third tier of services.
Their relationship with the hospitals that their patients use is dif-
ferent both within the three local groups, which negotiate sepa-
rately with the participating hospital, and between those groups
and the statewide HMO, where the hospital costs and negotia-
tions are handled entirely by Blue Shield.
Thus, not only do we have inadequate information about the
extent to which different forms of compensation are being used,
but we also have little information about how many patients are
affected by particular sets of incentives. Such information will be
extremely hard to obtain. As the next section points out, even if
that information is obtainable, it might be largely irrelevant.
II. HOW DIRECT ARE DIRECT FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES?: THE ROLE OF PHYSICIAN GROUPS
Stanford's triple option plan contracted not with physicians,
but with physician groups. In a group practice, each physician
does not "eat what he kills," a phrase from other professional
organizations that is particularly jarring when used with physi-
cians. Instead, the group as a whole decides how to pay its phy-
sician members. Therefore, even if a group has an HMO contract
that provides for strict capitation, the group might, in its own
compensation scheme, pay the physicians on the basis of any
system: salary, profit sharing, capitation, bonus, fee-for-service,
or any combination of the above. To determine the effective inci-
dence of the direct financial incentives, we would need to know
two things beyond how the HMO pays physicians: i) how many
HMO members receive care through doctors in group practices;
and, ii) how those group practices compensate their physicians.
We know neither.
A. How Much HMO Care Is Provided in Physician Groups?
We can approach an answer to the first of those questions in
two different ways. The 540 HMOs in the country often are di-
vided according to their type: staff, group, network (a combina-
W'mter 1996]
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tion of groups), and IPA. In 1993, about ten percent of all
HMOs were predominantly staff model, thirteen percent were
group model, thirteen percent were network model, and sixty-five
percent of HMOs were IPAs. 19 Patient membership was distrib-
uted somewhat differently: ten percent staff, twenty-nine percent
group, thirteen percent network, and forty-nine percent IPA.20 As
staff, group, and network HMOs, by definition, involve group
practices, we know that, at a minimum, fifty-one percent of all
HMO members received care through doctors belonging to
groups. This is only a floor, as IWAs can include sole and small
practices and groups. The proportion of IPA-model HI4O mem-
bers who receive care in each physician setting is unknown,
making "more than half" only a very rough floor for the per-
centage of HMO members seen by physicians in group practice.
The second route looks at the significance of physician
groups in general and at the rate at which they contract with
HMOs. We know, among other things, that physician groups are
common, are growing, and are disproportionately likely to con-
tract with HiMOs.
The American Medical Association has long kept track of
the number of physicians practicing in "groups." The AMA's
survey data define a physician "group" as:
The provision of health care services by three or more physi-
cians who are formally organized as a legal entity in which
business and clinical facilities, records, and personnel are
shared. Income from medical services provided by the group
are [sic] treated as receipts of the group and distributed accord-
ing to some prearranged plan.2'
The percentage of active, non-federal physicians in group
practice grew from 0.9% in 1932 to 10.2% by 1965 to 26.2% in
1980 and 30.0% in 1987.22 By 1991, the figure had reached
32.6%.23 This percentage conceals broad regional differences: the
West North Central census division counted just under sixty per-
cent of its physicians in group practice, while the Middle Atlan-
19. MANAGED CARE DIGFST, supra note 17, at 2.
20. Id.
21. PENNY L HAVLiCEK Er AL, AmERICAN MED. ASs'N, MEDICAL GROUPS IN THE U.S.,
A SURVEY OF PRACCE CHARACTERISTICS (1993 ed. 1992).
22. MEDICAL CARE CHATBOOK 177 (Leon Wyszewianski & Stephen S. Mick eds., 9th
ed. 1991) (charting the percentage of active, non-federal physicians in group practice from
1932-1987).
23. HAvLCEK Er AL, supra note 21, thl. 8.2 at 44.
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tic division had just over twenty percent; North Dakota had
94.8% of its doctors in group practice, followed by Minnesota at
82.7%, while New York had the lowest percentage in the nation,
at 15.2%.24 Although most group practices are small, most group
practice doctors are in medium to large groups. About forty-five
percent of the group practices had three or four members, but
practices with 100 physicians or more accounted for about one-
third of all group practice physicians.25
Apart from HMO employees, in the relatively rare staff
model HMOs, fifty percent of surveyed active physicians had at
least one HMO contract in 1993. Of sole practitioners, who still
make up about half or more of all practicing physicians, just
under forty percent had at least one HMO contract in 1993. For
practices of ten to twenty-four doctors, sixty-three percent had an
HMO contract. And seventy-eight percent of practices with
twenty-five or more doctors had HMO contracts. 26 Thus, physi-
cian groups are common, are growing, and are more likely than
other forms of practice to have HMO contracts. But we still do
not know how many members of HMOs are treated by physi-
cians practicing in physician groups, let alone how many mem-
bers are treated by physicians receiving direct financial incen-
tives from the HMO.
B. How Do Physician Groups Pay Their Doctors?
Our very rough idea of the importance of group practice
physicians in HMOs is precision itself compared to our under-
standing of how group practices pay physicians. We know they
pay in many different ways; we do not know which ways are
more common, particularly in practices that have substantial in-
come from HMOs, let alone from HMOs that use direct financial
incentives. Again, let us look at some specific examples of phy-
sician group compensation methods, taken from my home region
in Northern California.
24. Id., supra note 21, thl. 7.2 at 34.
25. Id. tbl. 3.1 at 7. These very large groups made up only 1.2% of all groups. Groups
with more than 25 and less than 100 physicians made up 4.2% of all groups and 16.5% of all
group physicians, so almost exactly half of group physicians practiced in groups with more
than 25 doctors.
26. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICs OF MEDICAL PRAcrIcE, 28 (Martin L. Gonzalez
ed., 1994) (discussing managed care participation rates by practice site).
Winter 1996]
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The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG) is the physician
group under exclusive contract to the Northern California Kaiser
Permanente System, which, with about 2.4 million members, is
the largest single HMO in the country.27 TPMG has about 3000
"physician shareholders," with several thousand additional phy-
sicians in their probationary periods or working part time. TPMG
pays its permanent physicians a salary, which is based largely on
the compensation for similar specialties in the outside market.
The physician's salary can be individually adjusted on an annual
basis for above- or below-average performance.
In addition, in most years, TPMG physicians receive a bo-
nus.28 The bonus is derived from two different sources. TPMG
has a capitation contract with the Kaiser Health Plan. If it pro-
vides the care it is contractually obligated to render to Kaiser
members for less than the amount of the overall capitation, it
keeps the difference. In addition, under the contract between the
Kaiser Health Plan and TPMG, if the Kaiser Hospital Foundation
(the third leg of the Kaiser system) has a surplus in its Northern
California operations, some part of that surplus is given to
TPMG for distribution.
In past years, the bonus pool has been divided up into sepa-
rate allocations for each of Kaiser's Northern California medical
centers. The TPMG physician-in-chief at each facility then would
allocate the bonus pool to the physicians working there, gener-
ally through an allocation to each department, to be further allo-
cated by the department chief.
In 1995, TPMG changed its bonus allocation process. Each
medical center's bonus allocation was put at risk. Fifty percent
of its allocation depended on whether the center met its budget;
the other fifty percent depended on positive changes in both pa-
tient satisfaction and patient access, both determined by exten-
sive consumer surveys. For 1996, the allocations are to include
as a further factor the quality of care provided by the facility, as
measured by objective outcome measures.
27. MANAGED CARE DIGEST, supra note 17, at 10. The information about TPMG that
follows is derived from letter from Blair Beebe, M.D., The Permanente Medical Group, to
Henry T. Greely, Professor, Stanford Law School (Jan. 15, 1996) [hereinafter TPMG letter]
(on file with Health Matrix).
28. TPMG is organized as a professional corporation. The permanent physicians are
shareholders of the corporation. They generally receive dividends on their stock each year,
but those dividends are nominal, on the order of $200 per physician.
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Thus, TPMG is a medical group whose income is entirely
capitated for physician services but has some potential financial
"upside" as a result of its patients' hospital utilization. Yet the
income of its more than 3000 doctors is affected mainly by spe-
cialty, by their standing with their department chair, by their fa-
cility's success on certain defined criteria, and by the Northern
California Kaiser system's overall success. Each TPMG physi-
cian, facing a decision to order a costly intervention for a pa-
tient, does have an incentive to economize, but its extent in any
given case is trivial.
Another local physician group, which I will call the Clinic,
is a multi-specialty group of about 160 physicians, practicing
near Stanford.29 The Clinic has contracted with six major HMOs.
It now receives about half of its revenue from capitation.
Compensation for Clinic physicians is on the basis of salary
plus bonus. It uses the outside market compensation for particu-
lar specialties as a starting point for setting the salary. The salary
and bonus also are affected both by the overall success of the
Clinic and by the individual physician's "productivity." The
Clinic has measured productivity largely on the basis of the
number of patients the physician has seen and the amount of ser-
vices she has billed. The Clinic now recognizes that measuring
"productivity" by billings may be a counterproductive strategy
with respect to its capitated patients. As a result, it is studying
possible changes in its system. At this point, however, its com-
pensation system seems to avoid any incentive for economizing
on the care of its capitated patients.
The Stanford Medical School's clinical faculty are, in effect,
another kind of physician group, one that practices in the Stan-
ford Health System. These physicians practice, and provide asso-
ciated clinical instruction, as part of their professional duties,
largely at the Stanford University Hospital and Clinic or at the
Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford. In the
past, the main part of their compensation has been a guaranteed
"tenure base" academic salary, which is set as part of the uni-
versity's academic salary process. This salary was largely inde-
pendent of the faculty physician's actual practice revenues. In ad-
dition, clinical faculty received non-guaranteed bonuses based on
29. The information concerning the Clinic is derived from telephone conversations, re-
ported in a memorandum by the author (on file with Health Matrix).
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the success of the Faculty Practice Program. In 1995, the Medi-
cal School shifted to a three-part "X,Y,Z" system.30 The first
part, X, is the tenure base salary. The second part, Y, is set pro-
spectively for one year at a time, based on the faculty member's
"professional responsibilities, productivity, accomplishments,
etc." The third part, Z, is a non-guaranteed bonus determined at
the end of the year, based expressly on clinical productivity.
Overall, the clinical faculty is expected to receive only about
sixty percent of its income through the tenure base. The so-
called Medical Center Line Faculty, whose focus is even more
on clinical services, derives a much higher percentage of its in-
come from clinical revenues. These changes attempted to build
in some incentives to reward more extensive clinical efforts by
faculty, but the connection between how Stanford Health Ser-
vices is compensated for patients and how the clinical faculty are
compensated remains unclear.
In all three of these examples, the description given applies
only to the "regular" physician members of the group. Each of
these groups will, from time to time, employ other physicians
who are compensated in any number of ways - from hourly or
shift wages, to salary, to a billings-based formula. Their incen-
tives may well differ from the incentives of their "regular"
colleagues.
HMOs may "pay" physicians in ways that create direct fi-
nancial incentives for them to change their styles of practice.
But, with respect to physicians in group practices, the effects of
those incentives will depend heavily on how the group pays its
doctors. In many cases, the group's compensation scheme may
mitigate, or even reverse, the incentives created by the HMO.
That is not to say that the incentives may not make them-
selves felt. The HMOs' direct financial incentives should lead a
physician group to encourage their physicians to practice in ways
that maximize the group's net income from the HMO. The physi-
cian groups have many ways to encourage their physicians to
adopt a particular practice style. They can educate physicians
about efficient practice styles, select and retain physicians who
are comfortable with those practice styles, apply peer (or man-
30. Stanford Medical School, Faculty Compensation in the School of Medicine: A Crit-
ical Assessment of Current Principles and a Recommendation for Change 7 (May 10, 1994)
(unpublished report, on file with Health Matrix).
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agement) pressure to adopt such styles, or give their doctors
some financial incentives to practice in those ways. None of
those forms of encouragement is exactly the same as the direct
and sometimes harsh financial incentives provided by the HMO.
Perhaps most importantly, these are forms of encouragement pro-
vided to doctors by doctors, through the mechanism of their
group practice.
I. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY: WHAT DOES
IT MEAN?
What are the implications of direct financial incentives for
patients and for public policy? This section of the Article ex-
plores those implications, suggests some possible steps that we
might take in the short run concerning them, and discusses some
longer run possibilities.
A. How Do Direct Financial Incentives Affect Patient Care?
To begin with, we need to remember what managed care is
all about. Health care always has been managed by someone. In
recent decades, it has been managed largely by physicians, occa-
sionally with the patient's solicited consent, but rarely with ac-
tual decisions made by the patient. This method of managing
care has led the United States to spend about fifteen percent of
its gross domestic product on health care, far more than compa-
rable nations. At that price, health care is widely seen as costing
too much - at least by those who pay the bills, mainly employ-
ers and governments. Nor has there been great public outcry to
increase taxes to finance these costs.
"Managed care" really means care managed by those who
pay for it: the insurers, health plans, employers, and governments
involved. Although managed care can be implemented in several
ways - micro-management, panel selection, and direct financial
incentives - all of these methods attempt to encourage less ex-
pensive health care. If direct financial incentives, or any of the
other methods of managing care, do not lead to less costly care,
they have failed and, presumably, will be abandoned.
Thus, direct financial incentives, like other managed care
methods, are intended to lower the cost of caring for patients.
Costs can be lowered in at least three different ways. First, pa-
tients can receive different and less expensive treatments at some
risk to their medical goals. Second, patients can receive different
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and less expensive treatments that are as good or better at meet-
ing their medical goals as the traditional treatment. Third, ex-
isting treatments can be made less expensive by paying less for
the goods and services that go into them.
As an example of the first method, a capitated plan that in-
cluded diagnostic tests within the capitation might lead a physi-
cian not to order an expensive magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scan for a patient even though there was a small, but non-
zero, chance the test would reveal something useful. An example
of the second method would be where direct financial incentives
lead physicians to educate asthmatics better about controlling
their disease, leading to fewer serious asthma attacks, better
health, and fewer expensive emergency room visits and hospital
admissions. Increasing the vaccination rates of a clinic's patients
would be another example of financial incentives leading to both
"better" and "cheaper" treatment. The third method could in-
volve a clinic's driving a hard bargain in contracting for MRI
services rather than buying, and underutilizing, its own machine.
It also could involve shifting to less expensive generic drugs or
could lead to paying less money for more work to technicians,
nurses, or even doctors.
The public concern about, and organized opposition to,
managed care has focused on the first method: the possibility
that direct financial incentives will lead to different treatments, at
some risk to patients' health. The argument is that when a physi-
cian knows that an additional expense will come out of her
pocket, not that of the insurer, she is strongly tempted not to or-
der it even though it is medically indicated.31 Defenders of man-
aged care have seized on the second method: arguing that its in-
centives for preventing disease both will cut cost and improve
health. There has been little public discussion of the possibility
that direct financial incentives will lead to tougher bargaining for
the goods and services used in providing health care, with poorer
financial results for suppliers, health care workers, and doctors.
We can safely assume, however, that this point has not been lost
on the groups most directly concerned.
31. Of course, accepting the argument that physicians will undertreat for financial rea-
sons, in spite of the long-run economic arguments, the malpractice liability risks, and their
professional ethos, strongly implies that physicians in a fee-for-service system, with few, if
any, of those countervailing factors, will regularly give in to the temptation to overtreat.
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To what extent are physicians adopting these three methods
of lowering costs as a result of direct financial incentives? More
specifically, to what extent are they risking patients' health by
cutting back on useful services? We do not know and we-have
little directly relevant evidence.32
A voluminous literature has built up over the past few de-
cades seeking to find differences in the quality of care between
fee-for-service and HMO systems. On balance, it seems to show
that HMOs do not provide any worse care - or much better
care. This verdict, however, is drawn largely from studies in the
1970s and 1980s, in an HMO world that featured more staff and
group plans than the present. We cannot safely extrapolate from
the responses of physicians in the systems studied in those eras
to the responses of physicians in today's many different systems.
And we have no credible evidence concerning the effects of to-
day's mix of direct financial incentives. As the GAO reported in
April 1995, "in the course of our work, we were unable to find
any systematic analyses of the effects of specific types of incen-
tives on the utilization of the services the incentives are intended
to reduce, such as the effect of a bonus for controlling specialty
referrals on such referrals." 33
In the absence of data, we are left with logic and anecdotes,
both often misleading when looking at human affairs. We will
start with logic and examine the short-term incentives faced by a
physician under a system of direct financial incentives.
In the short term, a physician confronting a patient does not
have the options of inventing a new form of cost-effective pre-
ventive treatment, negotiating a lower price for drugs, or firing a
nurse. In that setting, given a choice of several plausible diag-
nostic or treatment options, the physician facing direct financial
incentives will have some incentive to choose the least expensive
option. How strong that incentive will be depends on two main
factors: the exact nature of the direct financial incentives used by
the HMO and, if the physician is part of a group, the compensa-
tion policies of that group. Depending on those arrangements, the
physician may face a direct choice between her own income and
32. From talking with physicians and others in the San Francisco Bay Area, the most
competitive medical market in the country, my guess is that in this region the little-discussed
third method is currently the most common, but I do not know of any good evidence to suu-
port that position.
33. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 38.
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what she considers her patient's well-being. As we have seen, we
know very little about either of those factors.
In theory, though, commentators have identified a number
of more detailed factors that plausibly seem related to the degree
of influence of direct financial incentives. The GAO report dis-
cussed nine such factors:
1) the extent of the physician's risk;
2) the existence and terms of stop-loss insurance;
3) the distribution of risk to individual doctors or groups;
4) the number of physicians sharing the risk;
5) the number of patients in a physician's patient panel;
6) the duration of the risk assessment period;
7) the generosity of the physicians' compensation for direct
services;
8) the portion of the physician's income derived from the HMO;
and,
9) the generosity of service utilization budgets34
Each of these factors relates quite plausibly to the force of
direct financial incentives on an individual physician. On the
other hand, neither the GAO, nor, in an earlier document, the
Health Care Financing Administration, found any empirical re-
search on the extent to which those factors actually influenced
doctors.35
Two other plausible factors are worth mentioning. The first
is drawn from work in cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychol-
ogists have carefully studied the way people react to risks. One
of their strongest findings is that people are more concerned
about losing something than about not gaining its equivalent.
When people are given a choice between two strategies, one con-
servative and one speculative, they prefer the conservative strat-
egy when a negative result would be to lose $5, but the specula-
tive strategy when a negative result would be a "fail to win" $5.
34. Id. at 34-36. The "service utilization budget" applies to some managed care sys-
tems that allocate physicians a specific budget for various outside services - e.g., laboratory
tests, radiology, and specialty referrals. In those cases, a service utilization budget that is
large relative to the patient pool's needs will put less pressure on the physician with respect
to any individual case. Of course, if the physician can keep some or all of a periodic surplus
in the service utilization budget, she still may have a strong incentive to deny the service to
any patient.
35. Physician Incentive Plans, supra note 8, at 59,024; GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at
37-38.
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People protect what they already have much more strongly than
what they hope to gain, even when the practical and probabilistic
results would be the same.3 6 Thus, a physician might feel a
stronger pressure to avoid having to pay a penalty to the HMO
than she would to gain a bonus.
The second factor is more mundane. At the end of the day,
direct financial incentives may give the physician a choice be-
tween how she treats her patients and how much money she
makes. The financial needs and desires of the individual physi-
cian are likely to be important in that decision. A physician with
large debts - from education, a house, gambling, or for any
other reason-may have a harder time accepting a reduction in
her income. The willingness to accept such a decline will un-
doubtedly also vary with the physician's personality.
Thus far, we have discussed factors that might influence an
individual physician facing particular direct financial incentives
to provide too little care. On the other hand, at least three impor-
tant factors will push against a physician's doing "too little."
First, truly doing "too little" for a patient often will be more ex-
pensive, in the long run, than offering the proper mix of services.
Screening for and treating hypertension can cost the physician
much less than paying for the treatment and hospitalization of a
patient whose undetected or untreated hypertension led to a seri-
ous stroke. Similarly, vaccinations can prevent later office visits.
Not all good treatment saves the capitated physician money in
the long run, but at least some, and possibly much, of it will.
Second, by doing too little, for whatever reason, physicians
put themselves at risk for malpractice liability. Although the is-
sue of reconciling managed care with malpractice liability has re-
ceived extensive academic attention in recent years,37 there is no
36. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspec-
tive, in BA mEs To CoNhFucr RESOLUnoN 54-56 (Kenneth J. Arrow et a]. eds., 1995) (dis-
cussing loss aversion and status quo bias).
37. See e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Con-
tainment, 17 L MED. & HEAtH CARE 347 (1989) (asserting that present legal standards can
accommodate cost containment incentives); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the
Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. Ray. 1719 (1987) (arguing that current law is inade-
quate where cost containment measures prevent physicians from delivering customary care);
John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L.
REv. 439 (1991) (arguing that a unitary malpractice standard inadequately protects indigent
patients in an era of cost containment). See also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost
Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
778 (1986) (describing legal methods and remedies to reduce the risk of denying technology
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precedent for a successful defense to a malpractice claim on the
ground that the physician's direct financial incentives encouraged
treatment that fell below the standard of care. In fact, dicta in
one influential case, Wickline v. State, expressly stated the
contrary:
[The physician who complies without protest with the limita-
tions imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judg-
ment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibil-
ity for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health care
payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his
own determinative medical decisions go sour.38
Third, and most important, physicians want to do the right
thing for their patients. Faced with a patient who the doctor be-
lieves really needs another test, the cost of which will come out
of the doctor's income, I am confident that almost all doctors, al-
most all of the time, will order the test. The sense of profession-
alism may be particularly strong in the case of direct financial
incentives where the decision to treat or not to treat is made by
the patient's personal physician and not by a remote utilization
review company that has neither treated nor seen the patient.
We have no data about how the factors discussed above af-
fect physicians, individually or in combination. We can guess
that the effects vary dramatically from physician to physician,
and from compensation scheme to compensation scheme, and we
may have some plausible intuitions about the direction of the ef-
fects. Without data, however, logic cannot take us any further.
Now consider two anecdotes, provided by litigation.39 Indi-
vidual lawsuits are, after all, just anecdotes, with greater or lesser
degrees of proof of their facts.
Many patients have sued with concerns about managed care
in the nine years since Wickline. Suits against managed care
firms have not proceeded as far or as fast as commentators ex-
pected, probably in large part because of the barriers the Em-
in health care).
38. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986). The second sentence of this comment was
explained by the same court in a later case, when it noted that the statement was dictum and
that the continuing liability of the physicians did not imply that the managed care plan was
itself exempt from liability. Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879-80 (Ct. App.
1990).
39. Of course, if one accepts the view that I have sometimes heard expressed that, for
lawyers, the plural of "anecdote" is "data," my earlier comment about the lack of data needs
to be qualified.
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ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) raises
against effective suits.40 Most of the reported litigation has in-
volved managing through micro-management. In Wickline itself,
the issue was authorization for an extended hospital stay, as was
the case in its successor, Wilson v. Blue Cross. A number of ap-
pellate cases have revolved around the effects of ERISA preemp-
tion on suits against health plans; those, also, generally have re-
volved around micro-management decisions. The Corcoran case
from the Fifth Circuit, for example, concerned authorization for
hospitalization in a difficult pregnancy.4'
Sometimes these cases allege that the managed care arrange-
ments created personal financial interests inimical to the patient's
interests. The most noteworthy of those cases concerned denial
by an HMO of an experimental treatment, high dose chemother-
apy plus autologous bone marrow transplantation for metastatic
breast cancer. It resulted in a $89 million jury verdict against a
California HMO. That case, Fox v. Health Net, included charges
that personal financial interest affected the result, but the finan-
cial interest alleged was that of the HMO's medical director, the
person who decided whether the procedure sought was
experimental. 42
More recently, the successful plaintiff's attorney in Fox rep-
resented the plaintiffs in another suit that based one cause of ac-
tion on direct financial incentives to physicians in an HMO plan.
This case concerns Joyce Ching who died in her early thirties of
colon cancer.43 Mrs. Ching was a member of an HMO. She re-
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). The primary burden is found in ERISA's preemp-
tion provision, § 514 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144. ERISA's preemption provision generally
means that with respect to health benefits provided through employers, suits cannot use state
law causes of action, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987), are limited to
contractual damages, Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992), and can be removed to federal court, where they
are heard without a jury, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
41. 965 F.2d 1321, (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
42. The Fox case was settled before the appeal was heard, so it did not result in a re-
ported appellate opinion. The case is well-described in Christine Woolsey, Jury Hits HMO for
Coverage Denial, Bus. INs., Jan. 3, 1994, at 1, 23 (describing the complaint and the decision
of California's Riverside County Superior Court). In that case, the plaintiff's claims were not
preempted by ERISA because the patient had received her health coverage through her hus-
band's employer, a public school district. Governmental employers had been exempted from
ERISA to save them from the burden of complying with its requirements. Ironically, this has
left governments as the only employers whose health plans are subject to tort damages, in-
eluding punitive damages, in those kinds of suits.
43. Olmos, supra note 1, at Al. The description of the case that follows is taken
largely from that article and from a copy of the complaint (on file with Health Matrix).
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ceived her care through a physician group, Simi Valley Family
Practice, that received $27.94 per month for her care. The com-
plaint alleged that the physician group had to pay for any diag-
nostic tests or referrals to specialists. When Mrs. Ching came to
the clinic in mid-August 1982 with abdominal and pelvic pain
and rectal bleeding, she was referred for an ultrasound examina-
tion, at a cost of over $200 to the clinic. The ultrasound had in-
determinate findings. It was not until her third visit, in October,
after her pain had greatly increased, that the physicians ordered
another diagnostic test, a barium enema x-ray, at a cost to the
clinic of $261. That x-ray showed a colon cancer which, after
seven operations and twenty months, proved fatal.
The complaint alleged that the cancer should have been di-
agnosed at an earlier and more treatable stage, but that the capi-
tation agreement made Ms. Ching's physicians too reluctant to
spend the money needed for the relevant tests. Anything they
spent on her diagnosis would come out of the group's income,
and the ultrasound already had devoured about eight months of
her capitation payments. The defense argued that colon cancer is
so rare in young adults without a family history of the disease
that the physicians properly did not test for it in the first visits.
The defense also pointed to the ordering of the ultrasound exam-
ination as evidence that the physicians were not ignoring their
patient's medical needs because of capitation.
Mrs. Ching's husband and young son did not sue the health
plan, probably because of the barriers ERISA imposes. Instead,
to the usual malpractice allegations against the treating physi-
cians, they added a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
arguing that the managed care contract created an impermissible
conflict between the physicians' interests and those of their pa-
tients. The plaintiff's attorney may have had three hopes for the
allegation: it might avoid the restrictions on damages for medical
malpractice cases; it might make it easier to win punitive dam-
ages; and it might allow into evidence otherwise irrelevant testi-
mony about the financial arrangements, which could sway the
jury's verdict.
Several times during the course of the trial, the trial judge
rejected efforts by the defense to eliminate the cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty. Just before the case went to the
jury, the judge granted a directed verdict on that cause of action,
removing it from the jury, but not erasing from their minds the
testimony that had been admitted during the trial, as they consid-
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ered the remaining, traditional, malpractice claims. The jury re-
turned a verdict on November 15, 1995, finding for the plaintiffs
in the amount of $3 million, which was then reduced to
$700,000 as a result of California's $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases. 44
The second anecdote also comes from southern California; it
concerns a dental malpractice claim. I learned of this case in
May 1995, when the plaintiff's attorney telephoned me, seeking
some (free) advice about suits concerning managed care. He told
me that his client, through the client's employer, had been a
member of an IPA-type HMO for dental care. The lawyer said
the HMO had only a small number of dentists in its panel in his
client's area, and that the HMO paid those dentists on a fully
capitated basis. His client had some serious dental problems, but,
the attorney said, none of the five HMO dentists the client vis-
ited would treat him. The first four, after determining the prob-
lem, told him that their schedules were full and kept him waiting
interminably. The fifth, after some discussion, told him that he
needed major root canal work. The attorney recounted that this
dentist said the HMO did not pay him enough to do that kind of
work. The dentist would be willing to pull the offending teeth
for the HMO's payment, but he would require an additional
$8,000 from the patient to fix the teeth. The patient had already
sued the individual doctors for malpractice and patient abandon-
ment, but was trying to find a successful theory for pursuing the
HMO.
These are just a few of the many anecdotes told, in court
and otherwise, about mistakes or abuses in managed care. As-
suming the allegations in these two cases are true, compare them
to the factors noted above.
The GAO report listed nine factors as potentially affecting
how a doctor responds to direct financial incentives: 1) the ex-
tent of the doctor's risk; 2) stop-loss insurance; 3) the distribu-
tion of the risk to individual doctors; 4) the number of doctors
sharing the risk; 5) the number of patients in the physician's (or
group's) panel; 6) the duration of the risk assessment period; 7)
the level of compensation by the HMO; 8) the percentage of in-
44. California Jury Awards $3 Million to Family of Deceased Cancer Patient, HEALTH
CARE DAILY (BNA), at D5 (Nov. 27, 1995); Paul Elias, Doctors Negligent in Woman's Can-
cer Death, Jury Finds, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1995, at A3; Paul Elias, Focus of Malpractice
Case Is Restricted to Negligence Issue, LA. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1995, at B1.
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come the physician or group gained from the HMO; and, 9) the
generosity of the service utilization budget.45 We identified two
other factors: the general reluctance to lose rather than not to
gain, and the physicians' individual financial situation and char-
acter. Then we noted three countervailing factors: the lower long-
term cost of effective care, the possibility of malpractice suits,
and the doctors' professional ethic.
In the Ching case, the physician group appears to have been
entirely at risk for her medical care, at least outside the hospital,
although we know nothing about the way the group compensated
individual doctors. Nor do we know anything about most of the
other factors, except the countervailing factors. In the case of a
possible missed colon cancer diagnosis, the patient's outcome
might be much worse; the group may have to provide more ex-
pensive services than if it caught the cancer earlier; and the risk
of malpractice liability is very real. Compared with the relatively
small cost of a barium enema x-ray or other diagnostic proce-
dures, such as colonoscopy, those countervailing factors seem
quite powerful.
The dental case looks quite different. There, all the dentists
involved were sole practitioners who were capitated for all ser-
vices to plan members. These dentists, therefore, would feel the
full brunt of any higher expenditure, with no sharing among their
colleagues. That expenditure, in this instance, apparently would
have been several thousand dollars. Here, the countervailing fac-
tors were not strong. Failing to act quickly apparently would not
increase the dentists' costs, and it might even lower them by
making removal of the teeth essential. The medical outcome for
the patient, though not at all pleasant, would not be life-
threatening. Because the patient's problem did not threaten death
or disability, his damages in any malpractice suit likely would be
fairly small, which would also decrease the chances that such a
suit would be brought.
B. What Should We Do in the Short Run?
We cannot dismiss the possibility that, in some circum-
stances, direct financial incentives could harm patients. It seems
plausible that we could identify some factors or situations that
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 34-36.
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might increase the odds of such bad outcomes. At the same time,
the health care world is in the midst of a complicated and rap-
idly changing revolution in how society buys care. At this point
in that revolution, what should be done about direct financial
incentives?
One set of at least partial answers has been advanced by the
federal government. In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1986, Congress had forbidden hospitals and prepaid health
care organizations with Medicare or Medicaid risk contracts from
knowingly making incentive payments to physicians to induce
them to reduce or limit services.4 The Act further required the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to report to Congress
about those incentive arrangements.
The ban on offending incentive provisions was to begin on
April 1, 1989. The implementation date was extended twice by
Congress, but before the second extended date, the HHS report
to Congress arrived.47 That report failed to find a link between
such incentive provisions and poor quality care. Perhaps as a re-
sult, Congress repealed the prohibition. In its place, Congress
substituted three rules governing organizations using such incen-
tives. First, the organizations could not have a physician incen-
tive plan that made specific payments to doctors to induce them
to limit or reduce medically necessary services to a specific indi-
vidual. Second, they had to tell HCFA about their physician in-
centive plans in detail. Finally, if their plans put physicians or
physician groups at "substantial risk," as defined by regulation,
they had to provide stop-loss insurance to the physicians and sur-
vey their present and past members about the members' access
to and satisfaction with the services they received. 48
In December 1992, HCFA issued its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to implement the 1990 legislation. The proposed
regulations spelled out the requirements that the organizations
disclose their physician incentive plans to HCFA, for Medicare,
and to state Medicaid agencies. They defined "substantial finan-
cial risk" as situations where a physician, or group, would have
either more than tweny-five percent (for physicians or groups
46. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313(c), 100
Stat. 2003 (1986).
47. DHHS Report, supra note 8.
48. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4204(a), 104
Stat. 1388-108 (1990).
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evaluated annually) or fifteen percent (if evaluated more fre-
quently than annually) of its total compensation from the organi-
zation at risk, based at least in part on services the physicians
did not provide directly. These "at risk" percentages count with-
holds, bonuses, capitation for referrals, and other systems. The
proposed regulation also would have implemented the stop-loss
and survey requirements. Finally, it clarified that, although physi-
cians could not be compensated for limiting medically necessary
services to an individual, they could be compensated for low ag-
gregate utilization.
Although this proposed regulation would have applied di-
rectly only to HMOs that had risk contracts with Medicare or
Medicaid, it could well have influenced HMO physician payment
plans more generally. As of early 1996, however, the regulation
remains in limbo. It has neither been adopted nor withdrawn.
I believe that what we know about direct financial incen-
tives justifies only a small part of the proposed regulation, and
no other substantive actions. We do not know enough to impose
any meaningful substantive action. In its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, HCFA itself disclaims any knowledge of informa-
tion connecting direct financial incentives to health problems.49 It
proposes the fifteen percent and twenty-five percent definitions
for "substantial financial risk" solely because those seem to be
near the limit of the risk amounts currently used by plans. As the
current plans have no proven problems, HCFA suggests, those
percentages should be safe. This, of course, entirely avoids the
questions of whether those percentages, or any percentages, are
necessary. Similarly, the ban on payments to induce limits on
services to particular individuals, which merely implements con-
gressional language, also lacks any attempt at justification. The
Notice gives, as an example of prohibited conduct, a $100 bonus
for each maternity patient discharged after two days in the hospi-
tal rather than three. Without more evidence, including medical
evidence about what is reasonable in the case of each such bonus
plan, there is no reason to assume that those plans should be
banned.5 0
49. Physician Incentive Plans, supra note 8, at 59,026.
50. Id. at 59,032-33 (stating that federal regulations should prohibit the operation of
physician incentive plans which make specific payments as a direct, or indirect, inducement
to reduce or limit medically necessary services provided to a specific enrollee). The statute
speaks of limiting "medically necessary" services. Of course, neither an HMO nor a doctor
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There seems little reason for substantive regulation when all
the regulators can say is that what they propose is consistent
with what the industry already does. And, when an industry is
evolving as rapidly as this one, such regulation may prove bur-
densome. The better public policy combines continued watchful-
ness with three steps to gather, and disclose, more information
about direct financial incentives to HMO members, to physicians
and physician groups, and to researchers.
The first step would be to require health plans to disclose to
their members, in some detail, the ways in which they manage
care: whether by micro-management, panel selection, or direct fi-
nancial incentives. Legislation mandating such disclosures has
been proposed in several states5' and has been supported by the
American Medical Association.52
Such legislation seems to have some real, but limited, costs
and benefits. The costs stem mainly from the complexity of the
required disclosures. Consider again the Stanford triple option
would admit that, in the circumstances where the earlier discharge occurred, an additional day
in the hospital was "medically necessary."
51. See, e.g., S.B. 1562, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1996); S.B. 718,
1996 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996); H.B. 2391, 180th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1996); H.B. 1015, 1996 Sess. (Va. 1996). In New York, a "Health Care Bill of Rights," in-
cluding a broad array of disclosure provisions for managed care plans, won the support of a
majority of the state's Assembly in 1995. The legislative session ended before the bill
reached the state Senate. Julie Johnsson, State Laws on Managed Care Spur New Battles, AM.
MaD. NEws, July 24, 1995, at 3. As of March 1996, only Maine has enacted an incentive dis-
closure requirement into law. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2337 (West 1995).
It is unclear whether such state legislation could be applied to employee plans. Not only
does ERISA generally preempt state laws that "affect" employee benefit plans, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144, but ERISA itself contains specific requirements concerning information that employ-
ers must provide about such plans, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031. On the other hand, this might be
upheld as a requirement that had general applicability to health plans, rather than to benefit
plans. See New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (finding that a state statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges
from patients and HMOs did not "relate to" an employee benefit plan within the meaning of
ERISA's preemption provision). Finally, the legality might vary depending on whether the
employer merely contracted with the HMO or whether, in some way, it actually "created"
the HMO, as in the Stanford triple option plan. In any event, there would be no legal barrier
to federal legislation requiring such disclosures.
52. In 1990, the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a report
stressing the ethical duty that managed-care physicians have to disclose relevant financial in-
centives and contractual restrictions relating to the delivery of health care under the plan.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Financial Incentives to Limit
Care: Financial Implications for HMOs and IPAs, in AMERICAN MED. ASsN'N, CODE OF MEDI-
CAl. ETHiCs: REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AmRICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 130 (1990). The Council issued a related report in 1995, reiterating the
importance of disclosure about managed care incentives. Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs, American Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330 (1995).
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plan. If the legislation were serious, a Stanford employee would
have to be told, first, that her physicians would be compensated
in different manners, and in different amounts, depending on
whether she used the HMO tier, the PPO tier, or the outside tier.
Then, within the HMO tier, she would be told that although the
basic system of compensation would be capitation with a with-
hold, the amount being paid to the physician or physician group
would be different for each of the three physician groups and for
the Blue Shield HMO. The extent to which particular services,
such as clinical laboratory services, were the financial responsi-
bility of the physicians would vary from group to group. Finally,
the actual incentives faced by the physicians in at least the three
groups with which Stanford directly contracted would depend on
the compensation policies of their physician groups. A complete
accounting then would have to describe those compensation poli-
cies and the ways that they differed for different physicians-pri-
mary care, specialists, new physicians, part-time physicians, and
so forth.
Such a full description seems difficult to create. It also
seems likely that description of their group compensation plans
would be resisted by physicians, whose political clout has been
used to encourage such legislation. The result most likely would
be a long and burdensome disclosure form that would fail to tell
employees how their personal physicians actually were paid for
seeing them.
Would even that limited information be useful to consum-
ers? In some cases, such as where employees have no choice of
health plans, the information would be of little value. Even em-
ployees who have choices would have to read and understand the
disclosure and then put a value on the differences from plan to
plan. It is questionable that several pages of fine print disclo-
sures, in fact, would change many prospective members' minds.
Of course, it might. If some consumers, in fact, are willing
to pay more for a plan that avoids direct financial incentives,
then there seems to be no reason not to give them that opportu-
nity.53 On the other hand, one should not expect much change as
a result.
53. Of course, such highly motivated consumers might determine this information
themselves, through, for example, asking doctors how they were paid. For those consumers, a
mandated disclosure could be unnecessary.
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A second solution would be more general disclosure of
management arrangements to those involved. It is possible that
physicians and physician groups contracting with managed care
organizations have inadequate information about the range of
management options that exist. Knowledge of the different op-
tions might allow them to bargain more effectively, in their own
interests, and, if the physicians think their patients would be im-
portantly affected, in their patients' interests.
A state medical society, for example, might create a reposi-
tory of contract terms offered by various managed care organiza-
tions. Some state medical groups already maintain such reposito-
ries. Those repositories could be created or expanded to include
the contractual provisions concerning micro-management, panel
selection, or direct financial incentives. They could then be open
to physicians-and the press and public-to allow a better un-
derstanding of the terms that are available. The repositories could
be required by legislation 54 or, unless barred by non-disclosure
clauses in the contracts, by the voluntary action of the con-
tracting physician groups themselves.
Of course, in seeking managed care contracts, physicians
compete with each other. The sharing of information among
competitors can have serious anti-competitive consequences, and
can lead to liability under the antitrust laws. It is unclear to what
extent the kinds of terms under consideration here would raise
antitrust concerns. In any event, the Department of Justice has is-
sued guidelines allowing health care providers to share even fi-
nancial information about contracts with a three-month delay.55
Such a delay should not destroy the value of the proposed con-
tract repository.
My final proposed solution builds on the first two: we need
more information for researchers and more researchers interested
in using it. Currently, information about how particular plans are
managing care is limited. If that situation were remedied, it
might be possible for a researcher to try to correlate methods of
54. Whether a state could enforce such legislation against ERISA plans remains uncer-
tain, for the same reasons discussed above.
55. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE Comm'N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT PolicY
AND ANALYTICAL PRINcIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANmTusr (Sept. 27, 1994). In
addition, to the extent the repositories were required by state law and carefully supervised by
the state, they might be immune from antitrust liability under the "state action" doctrine. See
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988) (finding immunity from antitrust laws only
where the state has made peer review state action).
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managing care with other variables. Quality of care obviously
would be a very important one, but quality is notoriously hard to
measure. Member satisfaction might be an easier variable to
measure. In some systems, member satisfaction is managed regu-
larly. The California Public Employees Retirement System, for
example, provides health plans for more than one million people
through more than twenty different health plans. This system
surveys its members' satisfaction with their plans on a regular
basis. If the management methods of the different plans were
known, it might be possible to tease out connections between
those methods and member satisfaction.
In the short run, then, what we need, is to know more about
direct financial incentives and their effects. Currently, we do not
know what methods are being used, how frequently, or with
what effects on patients. Nor do we know whether those methods
have effects in the markets; consumer reactions might be driving
plans toward one, or a few, methods. At this stage, we just do
not know enough to propose substantive regulation of direct fi-
nancial incentives.
C. What Might We Do in the Long Run?
I want to end by speculating about two kinds of longer run
responses to direct financial incentives in managed care. One
would limit managed care's use of some direct financial incen-
tives; the other would try to adapt medical practice to those
incentives.
The first, and nearer term, response would be to control
what kinds of direct financial incentives could be used by man-
aged care organizations. If evidence from research made it clear
that some combinations of managed care incentives hurt patients,
those methods could be banned or discouraged. Even if the evi-
dence were clear, there are some good reasons to focus on the
second verb.
Banning managed care arrangements is likely to be quite
difficult and intrusive. First, it is unlikely that any one arrange-
ment will be a bad thing for patients in all circumstances. As the
GAO report pointed out, a number of factors have been put for-
ward as causing concern about direct financial incentives. An in-
centive, such as global capitation, could be very worrisome when
dealing with a sole practitioner whose entire income came from
that capitation. It could cause less concern if the practitioner got
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less than five percent of his income from that source. It would
cause almost no concern if the practitioner were part of a medi-
cal group of several hundred, or several thousand, physicians,
among whom that risk was spread widely.
Applying such restrictions in an appropriately narrow man-
ner is likely to prove difficult in several ways. It will be hard,
politically, to treat one sector of medicine more restrictively than
another, even if the restrictions are "for their own good." It will
be hard to determine exactly where the boundaries are between
practices that are "large enough" and "too small."
Second, if taken seriously, those kinds of restrictions would
have to apply not only to how the managed care plan paid the
physicians, but also to how physicians in groups pay each other.
Logically, there is no difference between the incentives that can
be created by either method, a point that the managed care in-
dustry would undoubtedly trumpet. Such a direct legislative in-
trusion into medical groups seems both unhappy and unlikely.
Finally, whatever regulations are created would be probed
immediately for loopholes. Both managed care organizations and
physicians will make a myriad of subtle or formal changes in or-
der to reach some perceived advantage under the rules. The re-
sult is likely to be an extended regulatory dance, of regulation,
evasive reaction, amended regulation, and new evasive response.
This kind of behavior exemplified the petroleum price and allo-
cation controls of the 1970s, which remain in litigation fifteen
years after they were abolished. They have long characterized
some areas of tax practice. In such regulatory dances, only the
lawyers, accountants, and regulators ultimately benefit.
The disadvantages of banning some forms of direct financial
incentives largely are avoided if, instead, we discourage danger-
ous forms. This could be done by publicity and market pressures.
Research into determining the dangers of various methods could
be commissioned, and then publicized. If coupled with a require-
ment that patients be told how their doctors are paid, this might
have a substantial effect in pushing managed care organizations
to focus on the safer incentive schemes.
Although, as Louis Brandeis stated, sunlight is the best dis-
infectant,5 6 it is rarely a panacea. Using publicity to discourage
dangerous systems of managed care would still be subject to
56. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE's MONEY 92 (1914).
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problems of context and of line drawing, as well as the further
problem of consumer understanding and reaction. Without a reg-
ulatory solution, however, both the ability and the incentive of
managed care organizations and physician groups to find and use
loopholes, would be much more limited.
The second form of solution would not so much adjust
managed care's incentives as adjust the context into which they
fit. The main drawback to direct financial incentives is their abil-
ity to overpower a physician's professional judgment and con-
vince her to treat her patient in a way that she does not believe
is best. Some would go further and argue that the more insidious
danger is that it would, subconsciously, change the physician's
idea of what good practice is, to the detriment of the patient.
The benefit of managed care's use of direct financial incen-
tives, at least compared with either micro-management or panel
selection, is that it lets the physician exercise her professional
judgment, without fear of being overruled by a utilization re-
view, or of being mysteriously "de-selected" from a closed PPO
or HMO panel. That fear is replaced by a fear of losing income,
which, in turn, is most pressing when the risks involved in the
financial incentives are not being shared.
In the long run, direct financial incentives may provide a
useful solution to the problem of managing care, but only in a
context where their risks are shared, and, hence, softened. The
obvious context is a large group practice with a compensation
system that does not just mirror the managed care incentives. By
setting their own compensation systems, physicians organized
into groups can spread the risk that one doctor will have particu-
larly expensive patients. At the same time, they have both the
opportunity and the incentive to see how each of them practices
medicine, and thus have a better chance to determine whether the
higher costs are from more expensive patients or unnecessarily
expensive physician practices. Finally, they have the opportunity,
mainly through peer interactions, to counsel and educate physi-
cians whose practice patterns seem inappropriate.
Through direct financial incentives, a physician group takes
on all the financial risk of a patient's treatments, but also takes
all the responsibility for it. Those incentives might be capitation,
a salary and bonus scheme, or even a global annual budget in a
single payor health care system. The key point is that the medi-
cal group, and not the utilization review nurses, the health plan
medical directors, or anyone else, can decide what care it thinks
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is optimal and how best it can be delivered. The group, unlike
outside parties, has the best chance to observe and change poor
physician care.
Thus, one way to adjust to direct financial incentives is to
reconstruct medicine into a world of fairly large group practices
that will be subject to those incentives. In light of the increase in
group practice in the last decades, that may be inevitable, with or
without direct financial incentives or even managed care. The in-
creasing group nature of practice may make direct financial in-
centives an opportunity, and not a threat.
The deeper issue of the ways in which direct financial in-
centives could change physicians' perceptions of proper medical
practice also requires some attention. I know many physicians
who practice under one form of managed care with direct finan-
cial incentives: the Kaiser Permanente system. They tell me that
they never feel pressure to make a treatment decision for finan-
cial reasons, but they also say that they practice differently at
Kaiser than they did elsewhere and that their views of what is
good medical practice have changed. Many of those differences
probably reflect simple changes with no ramifications for patient
care. Physicians may use less expensive but equally effective
drugs, or not keep patients in the hospitals longer than studies
show is appropriate. All agree that much unnecessary, or unnec-
essarily expensive, care can be wrung out of the medical system.
At some point, though, when the unnecessary care has been
eliminated, society still may be unwilling to pay the bill for all
the appropriate care that is technically available. Under a system
of care delivered by physician groups, operating under financial
incentives, these rationing decisions would be made largely by
the physician groups. This may be a good description of the cur-
rent British National Health Service, since the reforms of the
early 1990s. 5 7 By burying the decisions in physician groups, one
avoids the kinds of express allocation rules that prompt litiga-
57. For some general background and interesting observations on the changes in the
British system, see Robert G. Lee & Frances H. Miller, The Doctor's Changing Role in Allo-
cating U.S. and British Medical Services, 18 L MED. & H.LTH CmAE 69 (1990) (observing
the similarities between American and British physicians' roles in allocating health care);
Frances H. Miller, Competition Law and Anticompetitive Professional Behavior Affecting
Health Care, 55 MOn. L REv. 453, 455 (1992) (discussing how competition laws might im-
pact market-distorting activity due to changes in the National Health Service); Frances H.
Miller, Doctors' Conflicts of Interest (& Altruism) in the United States and Great Britain, 27
IND. L. REv. 687, 694-95 (1994) (book review).
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tion-and accountability.58 Are physician groups the right bodies
to make these rationing decisions? Compared to having them
made by managed care groups? Congress? The courts? The
"market?" These questions may lurk below the surface of the
speculative future outlined above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Not all physician groups will respond to direct financial in-
centives in the same manner. In the best of all worlds, consumers
would have a choice of what groups they would use. This choice
might come through managed care plans that contract with sev-
eral groups, or through a world in which each patient was able
to choose among several managed care plans, each of which con-
tracted with one or more groups. In some parts of the country,
the population will be too sparse to support more than one, or
even one, such physician group; in most of the country, the
groups might exist, but patients may not have access to them, at
least not through their health coverage.
The late, and, I believe, insufficiently lamented Clinton
Health Plan would have solved the second problem. Under that
plan, families would have been able to choose among several
managed care, and non-managed care health plans through a
health alliance, which would have been responsible for collect-
ing, analyzing, and providing information to families about con-
sumer satisfaction and quality in each plan. In a world that is, at
least for the time being, "post" health reform, that kind of
choice between responsible physician groups remains rare.
With direct financial incentives in managed care, as with al-
most every other important question about the American health
care system, we ultimately arrive at the importance of thorough
reform of the health care financing system. As we struggle
through these ancillary issues, we must never forget that the fun-
damental issue remains unresolved.
58. The two other forms of managing care, through micro-management or de-selection,
necessarily generate some kinds of express rules or standards about practicing medicine. Their
existence, even if internal to the organization, means that it is possible for them to be discov-
ered (both literally and litigatively) and challenged. Physician groups might allocate by simi-
larly express standards, but they also might not.
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